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Justice for Iowa:
Samuel Freeman Miller's
Appointment to the United States
Supreme Court during the Civil War
MICHAELA. Ross
DURING THE SPRING OF 1862, three seats on the United
States Supreme Court sat empty, even though the Court would
soon hear arguments in cases that would decide the constitu-
tionality of President Lincoln's controversial war measures. De-
spite the critical need for Republican voices on a Court domi-
nated by Democrats and southerners, Lincoln had postponed
making nominations to the Court while he waited for Congress
to pass a judicial reorganization bill that would reduce the num-
ber of southem seats on the supreme bench. Because the Court
had long been a bastion of proslavery sentiment, Lincoln favored
a thorough restructuring of the judicial circuits that would give
the Court a permanent northem majority and prevent its justices
from ever again issuing such an infamous decision as Dred Scott
V. Sandford. Lincoln thus hoped Congress would quickly pass a
judicial reorganization bill that would allow him to begin to re-
shape the Supreme Court in the Republicar\s' image.
Despite the urgency of the situation, however, Iowa's con-
gressional delegation, led by Senator James Grimes and Con-
gressman James Wilson, purposefully delayed the proposed
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leen Blain Roberts, and the anonymous referees of the Annals ofloiva for their
helpful comments on this article. I also gratefully acknowledge that a grant
from the State Historical Society of Iowa helped to fund the research.
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judicial reorganization bill for months. They did so even though
it meant that key seats on the Court would remain unfilled and
that Chief Justice Roger Taney and the other pro-southern mem-
bers of the Court might declare some of Lincoln's war measures
to be uncor\stitutional. The purpose of this article is to explain
why Grimes and Wilson—^both of whom were staunch Republi-
cans and supporters of the Union war effort—delayed the re-
organization bill and how their efforts eventually led President
Lincoln to appoint Keokuk's Samuel Freeman Miller to the na-
tion's highest tribunal. In contrast to earlier treatments of these
developments, which suggest that the Iowans' efforts were mere-
ly machinations designed to get a personal friend appointed to
the bench, this article will show that ideological imperatives
drove the campaign to appoint Miller, and it reflected significant
regional and ideological fissures within the Republican Party.'
ABRAHAM LINCOLN came to the presidency in 1861 deter-
mined to reshape the Supreme Court. The Court had, after all,
helped to precipitate the crisis that engulfed the nation, and
many northerners viewed Roger Taney's 1857 opinion in Dred
Scott as the proximate cause of the war. That opinion ruled that
African Americans could not be citizens of the United States
and that Congress could not prohibit the expansion of slavery
into the territories.^ Lincoln regarded the Dred Scott decision as
1. Several historians have noted the extraordinary efforts Iowa's congressional
delegafion made to delay judicial reorganization and to ensure Miller's ap-
pointment. These scholars have, however, minimized or ignored the Iowans'
ideological motivations. David Silver, for example, argues that Senator Grimes's
goal in delaying judicial reorganization was "an appointment for his friend
Samuel F. Miller." This explanation, although partially correct, fails to explain
the larger ideological and economic forces that led Iowa's delegation to fight so
long and so hard, even when they knew doing so might jeopardize Lincoln's
war powers. David M. Silver, Lincoln's Supreme Court (Urbana, IL, 1956), 51-53.
The portion of Silver's book dealing with Miller's appointment was reprinted
as "Lincoln's Appointment of United States Justice Samuel F. Miller" in Annals
of Iowa 33 (1957), 510-25. See also Stanley I. Kutler, Judicial Poxver and Reconstruc-
tion Politics (Chicago, 1968), 16,17; and Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents,
and Senators: A History of U.S. Supreme Court Appointments fi-om Washington to
Clinton, rev. ed. (Lanham, MD, 1999), 88.
2. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857); Paul Finkleman, Dred
Scott V. Sandford: A Brief History with Documents (Boston, 1997), 29.
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so inflammatory, so clearly biased, that he—and other Republi-
cans—refused to defer to the judgment of the nation's highest
tribunal. Instead, he declared that Dred Scott was wrong and
that it should be overturned. "We think the Dred Scott decision
is erroneous," he had argued in 1858. "We know the Court that
made it has often over-ruled its own decisions and we shall do
what we can to have i t . . . over-rule this."^ While campaigning
in 1860, Lincoln and other Republicans had pledged to "recon-
stitute" the Court if their party captured the presidency. Now, as
president, Lincoln hoped to fulfill that pledge.''
Once in office, Lincoln had immediate opportunities to leave
his imprint on the Court. When he arrived at the White House,
the Court already had one vacancy. Justice Peter Daniel of Vir-
ginia, a member of the Dred Scott majority and "a brooding pro-
slavery fanatic" had died the previous May. President Buchanan,
overwhelmed by sectional pressures, had simply left the seat
empty.'^  One month into Lincoln's presidency, a second seat on
the Court opened. On April 4,1861, Justice John McLean of Ohio
died at the age of 76. A dissenter in Dred Scott, McLean was a
hero to many abolitionists, and he would have been a friend of
the new administration. Although Republicans mourned his loss,
his departure did mean that Lincoln could now fill two seats on
the Court with energetic, younger justices of his own choosing."
Later in April, yet another seat on the Court opened when Jus-
tice John A. Campbell of Alabama, a member of the Dred Scott
majority, resigned to join the Confederacy. Thus, as the nation
descended into Civil War, some solace could be taken in the
loosening of the South's control of the Supreme Court. Lincoln
would now have the opportunity to appoint one-third of the
Court's justices/
3. Roy P Basier, ed.. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. (New
Brunswick, NJ, 1953-1955), 2:401 (hereafter cited as Collected Works); James M.
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York, 1988), 176.
4. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, \77.
5. Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and
Politics (New York, 1978), 234; McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 174; Silver,
Lincoln's Supreme Court, 3.
6. Silver, Lincoln's Supreme Court, 9,10.
7. Ibid., 10.
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Even with these three vacancies, however, Lincoln still faced
a hostile Court, one unlikely to approve of Republican war
measures or to overturn Dred Scott. Of the remaining six jus-
tices, five—ajames Wayne, John Catron, Roger Taney, Robert
Grier, and Samuel Nelson—had been in the Dred Scott majority,
and the sixth—Nathan Clifford of Maine—^was an embittered,
proslavery Democrat. Even if Lincoln appointed three zealous
Republicans, the Court's majority would still comprise men un-
sympathetic to Lincoln and his party If Lincoln needed confirma-
tion of this fact, it came very early with Roger Taney's opinion
in Ex Parte Merryman, in which the chief justice ruled that the
president did not have the power to suspend habeas corpus, even
during a national emergency.^
Although Lincoln ignored Taney's Merryman decision, he
knew that the Court would surely continue to attempt to check
presidential war powers. Lincoln recognized that a civil war
required drastic measures, and he often ignored constitutional
niceties. With the list of controversial measures growing rapidly,
each new directive that left his desk increased the possibility of
a major confrontation with the Supreme Court. During the early
months of the war, Lincoln ordered the Union navy to blockade
southern ports, and he had several members of the Maryland
legislature arrested for their political views. In October 1861 he
suspended habeas corpus all along the eastern seaboard from
Washington to Bangor, Maine—even though the northeastern
states were not in rebellion. And although Congress reconvened
for an emergency session in the summer of 1861 and promptly
passed bills approving Lincoln's extraconstitutional actions, the
constitutionality of many of the president's war measures re-
mained in doubt. Clearly, at some point, many of Lincoln's poli-
cies would face the judicial scrutiny of the Supreme Court''
TANEY'S MERKYMAl^ OPINION, combined with lingering
anger over Dred Scott, also fueled new calls by Republicans to
pack the Court with Lincoln appointees. The New York Tribune
8. Ex Parte Merryman. F. Cas. 9487 (1861).
9. Mark E. Neely, The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (New
York, 1991), 14,15,24.
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proposed increasing the number of seats on the Court to eleven,
justifying its position by pointing to the role Dred Scott had
played in causing the war. "The present rebellion," the Tribune
noted in its defense of the court-packing plan, "is due quite as
much to an unsound and unwise decision of the Supreme Court
as to any other single cause.""^
In December 1861, Republican Senator John P. Hale of New
Hampshire revealed an even more radical plan for reconstituting
the Court. Hale offered a resolution directing the Senate Judiciary
Committee to inquire into the possibility of "abolishing the pres-
ent Supreme Court" and starting from scratch with a new Court.
And where, observers wondered, would the Congress find the
authority for this audacious plan? Hale cited Article III, Section
One, of the Constitution, which states, "The judicial power of
the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in
such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, or-
dain and establish." Hale interpreted this to mean that Congress
could establish new Supreme Courts from "time to time." "My
idea," Hale blustered, "is that the time has come." Moderate Re-
publicans, however, viewed Hale's plan as extreme and stifled it
in committee."
Proponents of a less radical plan for restructuring the Court
met with more success. They proposed reorganizing the na-
tion's judicial circuits in order to decrease the South's dispro-
portionate representation on the Court. In 1861 the nation's fed-
eral courts were divided into nine judicial circuits, five of which
encompassed slaveholding states. Each circuit was supervised
by a justice of the United States Supreme Court. In most cases,
the supervising justice hailed from the region he supervised.'^
It had been 25 years since the last modification of the circuits.
During that time, the North's population had exploded, while
the South's had lagged behind. The resulting imbalance between
population and representation on the Court infuriated northem-
10. New York Tribune, 13 December 1861. See also Chicago Tribune, 4 March 1861;
Ferhenbacher, Dred Scott, 576-77; Silver, Lincoln's Supreme Court, 39,40,
11. Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d sess., 1861, 26-28, 37, 155; Silver, Lin-
coln's Supreme Court, 42, 43; Fehrenbacher, Dred Scott, 576-77.
12. Taney issued his decision in Ex Parte Menyman in his capacity as a circuit
court judge.
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ers. "The twenty millions of the people of the free states are rep-
resented by four judges," the Chicago Tribune complained, "while
the nine millions of whites in the South have five judges."'^ Like
the notorious three-fifths clause in the Constitution, which al-
lowed the South to include slaves in the population totals used
to determine representation in the House of Representatives,
the organization of the judicial circuits seemed to give the slave
States an unfair advantage. The population of the Seventh Cir-
cuit alone (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan) equaled that of
the five southem circuits combined. Such disparity led Iowa's
Congressman James R Wilson to call the Court a "monstrous
citadel of slavery."'*
In addition to the sectional imbalance, reorganization was
overdue as a result of the nation's westward expansion. Texas,
Florida, VNTisconsin, Oregon, Minnesota, Kansas, Califomia, and
Iowa had not yet been assigned to circuits. Proponents of
change could thus cite both practical and political justifications
for a major judicial reorganization.
13. Chicago Tribune, 5 June 1862.
14. Keokuk Gate City, 29 July 1862.
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Abraham Lincoln joined the chorus of voices calling on
Congress to reorganize the circuits and vowed to delay making
any appointments to the Court until that task was accomplished.
In his first annual message to Congress, in November 1861, Lin-
coln announced his support for a plan that would reduce the
number of southem circuits and increase those from the North.
Pointing to the North's tremendous growth, Lincoln noted that
during Justice McLean's tenure the population of the Seventh
Circuit had grown from 1,470,000 to 6,151,000, a circuit "alto-
gether too large for any one Judge." A change had to be made.
Efficiency, logistics, and simple fairness all pointed to the need
for reorganization. Because two of the three vacant seats on the
Court had been held by southerners, moreover, those justices'
former circuits could now be condensed with minimal disrup-
tion to the circuits of the sitting justices.'^
The Congress heeded Lincoln's call. Six days after the presi-
dent's speech. Senator John Sherman of Ohio introduced a bill
to reorganize the circuits to consolidate the southem circuits
and add a new circuit in the North. The Senate referred the bill
to its Judiciary Committee, while in the House, Representative
John Bingham of Ohio introduced a bill similar to Sherman's.'^
After a month of deliberations, the Senate Judiciary Committee
endorsed Sherman's proposal. Under Sherman's plan, three ju-
dicial circuits would be assigned to the Northeast {population
10.6 million); three would cover the South (population 9.9 mil-
lion); and three would represent the West (population 10 million).
Under this plan, all three vacancies on the Court would be in
westem circuits. Lincoln's appointments, therefore, would have
a profound effect on the administration of justice in that region.''
With a plan on the table, members of the Judiciary Com-
mittee urged their fellow senators to approve the bill quickly.
Because Lincoln had postponed making appointments until the
reorganization of the circuits was complete, the Court had oper-
15. Lincoln's first annual message to Congress, 3 December 1861, in Collected
Works, 5:35-53,
16. The bill was titled An Act to Amend the Judicial System of the United
States. Silver, Lincoln's Supreme Court, 50, 51.
17. California and Oregon would, for the time being, be left out of the circuit
system.
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MAP 2
United States Circuit Court Districts,
Shermarr Plan
1860
Districts Population
(in millions)
2.36
H
D
D
ated for almost a year with only six members. With the consti-
tutionality of Lincoln's war measures hanging in the balance,
many senators hoped for quick passage of the plan so that Re-
publican appointees could reshape the Court's jurisprudence.'"
DESPITE THE NEED FOR EXPEDIENCY, the judicial re-
organization bill met stiff opposition from an unexpected source:
Iowa's Republican congressional delegation. In the midst of the
Civil War—a crisis that had created a pressing need for Repub-
lican justices on the Court—Iowa's delegation delayed the cir-
cuit reorganization bills in the House and Senate for months,
even though doing so meant that three seats on the Supreme
Court would go unfilled. Congressman James Wilson had
18. Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2d sess., 1861,187-88,469.
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MAP 3
United States Circuit Court Districts,
Judicial Reorganization Act of 1862
1860
Districts Population
(in millions)
2.36
4.66
3.58
3.01
3,66
D
particular success in keeping the House version of the bill "bot-
tled up in committee."''
Although Iowa's senators and congressmen welcomed the
idea of reorganizing the circuits, they resisted the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee's plan to place the Hawkeye State in the new
Ninth Circuit with Illinois. Because of the economic and politi-
cal importance of Chicago and the rest of Illinois, Lincoln would
almost certairUy appoint a justice from his home state to super-
vise the circuit. Already rumors were swirling that Lincoln
would nominate his friend Senator Orville Browning for the
position. Indeed, Lincoln had told others that he felt he "must
appoint Browning."^
19. Silver, Lincoln's Supreme Court, 52.
20. Noah H. Swayne to Benjamin F. Wade, 10 January 1861, Wade Manuscript
Collection, Library of Congress; Silver, Lincoln's Supreme Court, 51,60.
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Many Iowans knew Browning well and held unfavorable
opinions of him. In the campaign of 1860, Browning spoke at
Republican rallies in Keokuk and other Iowa dties and even
stayed at Samuel Miller's house. (Miller was then a Keokuk
lawyer and Republican organizer.) Most Iowa Republicans
shared Browning's moderate views on slavery, but his positions
on other issues made him suspect. Before serving in the Senate,
Browning was a wild-eyed booster of railroads. With his friends
he had promoted the Northern Cross, a railroad that had relied
heavily on community subscriptions to railroad stock. In the
1850s, Browning had traveled from town to town giving
speeches encouraging local governments to go into debt to sup-
port the Northern Cross's construction. But after the river-town
economies crashed in 1857, Browning steadfastly opposed the
repudiation of bonds and other debts, and he later would be
hostile to the regulation of railroads.''
During the 1850s, many Iowa counties and towns had gone
heavily into debt in a frenzied effort to bring railroads to their
communities. Municipalities helped fund private railroad enter-
prises by issuing bonds, using the money raised to buy stock in
the railroad companies. When the economy turned sour, how-
ever, those public debts destroyed the grand dreams of many
communities. When eastern bondholders refused to renegotiate
those debts, Iowans grew embittered and turned to the courts
for relief. In 1862 the Iowa Supreme Court granted their wishes
by ruling that the bonds were void because county and town
officials never had constitutional authority to issue the bonds.^ ^
Out-of-state bondholders then sued in federal court to force the
Iowans to pay their debts. Because the U.S. Supreme Court
would soon be hearing numerous cases involving Iowa railroad
bonds and other cases that pitted Iowa steamboat corporations
against Illinois railroads, Iowans hoped to avoid being saddled
with a justice like Orville Browning who would be unsympa-
thetic to their economic concerns.
21. Maurice G. Baxter, Orville H. Browning: Lincoln's Friend and Critic (Bloom-
irigton, IN, 1957), 57,68, 111, 224.
22. The State oflawa ex rel v. The County of Wapello, 13 Iowa R. 388 (1862); Michael
A. Ross, "Cases of Shattered Dreams: justice Samuel Freeman Miller and the
Rise and Fall of a Mississippi River Town," Annals of Iowa 57 (1998), 227-39.
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At the end of January 1862, as it became clear that the reor-
ganization of the circuits would be delayed, Lincoln was com-
pelled to make a nomination to fill John McLean's vacant seat
on the Court. (McLean's Seventh Circuit then consisted of Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan). Lincoln had hoped to wait un-
til reorganization was complete, but when Justices Taney and
Catron became ill, the already depleted Court could not main-
tain a quorum.^ ^ For the position, Lincoln chose Noah Swayne, a
Republican from Ohio with impressive antislavery credentials.
Like Samuel Miller, Swayne had been bom in a slaveholding
state, studied medicine, switched to law, acquired slaves through
marriage, and then emancipated them. Eventually, he moved to
Ohio, where he helped form the state's Republican Party and
served as counsel in fugitive slave cases. Swayne's sterling Re-
publican credentials allowed Lincoln to assume (correctly, as it
tumed out) that Swayne would, if appointed, uphold his war
measures/*
There was more to Swayne, however, than just his anti-
slavery views. As an attomey, Swayne had grown wealthy rep-
resenting railroads, banks, and other corporations, and he em-
braced the economic outlook of America's financial elites. In
1856, for example, Swayne defended the Mad River and Lake
Erie Railroad in a suit brought by a company brakeman who
had been thrown under a train and maimed as a result of de-
fective brake rods. In the well-publicized case that followed the
accident, Swayne successfully argued that by agreeing to be
hired, the brakeman had voluntarily assumed the risk of injury
and should not be compensated for his injuries.^ ^
Swayne also had close ties to New York City wealth. Samuel J.
Tilden, a Democrat and leading New York corporate lawyer, ac-
23. Silver, Lincoln's Supreme Court, 51.
24. Richard L. Aynes, "Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases," Chicago-Kent Law
Reviexo 70 (1994), 674, 675; Jonathan Lurie, Noah Haynes Sivayne, in TJie Oxford
Companion to the Supreme Court, ed. Kermit Hall (New York, 1992), 850.
25. Mad River and Lake Erie R.R. v. Barber, 5 Ohio State Reports 541 (1856). For
a more detailed discussion of cases of this type, see John Williams-Searle,
"Courting Risk: Disability, Masculinity, and Liability on Iowa's Railroads,
1868-1900," Annals of Iowa 58 (1999), 27-77.
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tively lobbied for him. The New York bar also petitioned Lincoln
on Swayne's behalf. Capitalists who supported Swayne weighed
in as well. Chicago railroad magnate William B. Ogden, the first
president of the Union Pacific, urged Swayne's nomination. In a
letter to Lincoln, Ogden pointed out that Swayne's considerable
fortune meant that "he has means to live handsomely indepen-
dent of his salary."^^
With Swayne's appointment, Ogden and other captains of
industry got their wish. "The war could not be prosecuted to a
successful conclusion w i^thout the support of Big Business," one
historian has noted, and Swayne's selection "satisfied business
interests at the same time that [it] satisfied Ohio politicians.""
With Swayne appointed and Browning rumored as a shoo-
in for a reorganized Illinois circuit, Iowans dug in their heels
and campaigned for a reorganization bill that would create a
new trans-Mississippi circuit. They hoped that a circuit made
up solely of westem river states, not including Illinois, would
get a presiding justice more sympathetic to their economic needs.
In March Iowa's state legislature passed a resolution urging its
congressmen (and requiring its senators) to fight for a circuit
made up solely of states west of the Mississippi. They also peti-
tioned Congress asking for the same.^ *
Unified and determined, Iowa's congressional leaders, led
by Senator James Grimes and Congressman James Wilson, sty-
mied the plan that put Iow a^ in the same circuit as Illinois. Al-
though once a promoter of railroads while living in Burlington
in the 1850s, Grimes—publicly at least—tumed against railroads,
bondholders, and capitalists after the Panic of 1857. Wilson, like
Grimes, had also tumed against railroads and financiers after
the Panic, and in 1860 he supported a controversial plan to
regulate railroad rates. Now in Congress, Wilson served as a
26. Silver, Lincoln's Supreme Court, 59; W. B. Ogden to A. Lincoln, 25 May 1861,
quoted in Carl B. Swisher, The Taney Period, 1836-64 (New York, 1974), 816.
27. Ernest Sutherland Bates, TIte Story of the Supreme Court (Indianapolis, 1936),
168; Silver, Lincoln's Supreme Court, 59.
28. Senate Misc. Document No, 73, 37th Cong., 2d sess,, p. 1. At that time,
senators were selected by state legislatures rather than by a direct vote of the
people. As a result, legislators had the leverage to demand that their senators
follow their wishes on key issues.
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member of the House Judiciary Committee, a strategic position
from which to influence the reorganization process.^ "*
Rather than placing Iowa in a circuit with Illinois, Wilson
and Grimes proposed creating a new Ninth Circuit out of Iowa,
Missouri, Minnesota, and Kansas. They argued that the four
states shared similar legal codes and that "their commercial re-
lations were closely connected by the Mississippi and Missouri
Rivers.""" Despite all the manic efforts to bring railroads and
eastem capital to Iowa in the 1850s, Iowa's leaders still felt more
kinship to states built on the steamboat trade, states that now
felt the effects of the river trade's decline and the burden of rail-
road debt.
Wilson also reminded his House colleagues of the crucial
role Iowa's troops were playing in the war and suggested that
the bravery of Iowa's soldiers entitled Iowans to the judicial cir-
cuit of their choice. Wilson noted that Iowa had sent "to aid in
crushing the atrocious rebellion, almost as many men as she
had voters in 1850; men than whom none more true, none more
brave, none more gallant ever encountered a foe on this field of
battle. The bloody fields of Pittsburgh Landing, Fort Donelson,
Belmont, Wilson's Creek, and Blue Mills, all attest how well and
nobly the gallant volunteers of Iowa have done." Wilson failed
to explain why "the gallant volunteers of Iowa" should not
share a judicial circuit with the gallant volunteers from Illinois,
but he may have realized that discussions of the Rock Island
Bridge, bond repudiation, railroads, or capitalists would not
have sounded as patriotic or persuasive.^'
As the Iowans successfully delayed the reorganization bills.
Republican Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan, a member of
29. Robert Cook, Baptism of Fire: The Republican Party in Ioxva, 1838-1878 (Ames,
1994), 103,107,109,123; Pred B. Lewellen, "Polihcaí Ideas of James W. Grimes,"
Iowa journal of History and Politics 42 (1944), 339-404; Silver, Lincoln's Supreme
Court, 55. For a sketch of Wilson's career, see Leonard Schlup, "Republican
Loyalist: James F. Wilson and Party Politics, 1855-1895," Annals of Iowa 52
(1993), 123-^9.
30. Iowa Congressman James F. Wilson, Speech, 4 June 1862, Congressional
Globe, 37th Cong., 2d sess., p. 2562; Swisher, Tlte Taney Period, 826; Charles
Fairman, Mr. justice Miller and the Supreme Court, 1862-1890 (New York, 1973),
47; Silver, Lincoln's Supreme Court, 55.
31. Wilson, Speech, 4 June 1862.
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the Senate Judiciary Committee, questioned their motives and
the idea that "there should be a division of judicial circuits upon
the Mississippi River." Under the Iowans' plan, Howard noted,
the circuits would once again have wildly disproportionate
populations. A circuit made up of Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota,
and Kansas would represent a population of only 2.1 million,
while Michigan's circuit and the circuit covering Indiana and
Ohio would have 3.2 and 3.7 million residents respectively. Was
not one purpose behind reorgaiùzation, Howard wondered, to
bring circuit court representation in line with population? Un-
der the current system, the South had disproportionate repre-
sentation. The Iowans' plan would replicate the problem, minus
only the disruptive variable of slavery. (Compare maps 2 and 3,
above.) "All of these inequalities and disproportions," Howard
complained, "are introduced . . . for the purpose of carrying out
the idea that there must be a separate circuit on the West side of
the Mississippi River." "Why are these inequalities intro-
duced?" he asked. "What is at the bottom of it?"''
Howard perceptively noted that the issue had broader, and
disturbing, implications. In the Iowa plan, Howard saw dan-
gerous sectionalism. By demanding a circuit made up solely of
states west of the Mississippi, the Iowans highlighted regional
differences and animosities. Against the backdrop of a bloody
civil war, such sectional identification made Howard uneasy.
"Indeed, I do not like it," Howard admorùshed. "In times like
these I am getting a little distrustful of geographical divisions.
We do not know what a day or even an hour may bring forth in
the midst of the trials and shocks the nation is now undergoing.""
Howard's concerns reflected an important development
within his party. Although Republicans shared a general world-
view that celebrated free labor, the party also suffered from sig-
nificant regional tensions. Republicans often divided over eco-
nomic issues along East-West, North-South, and urban-rural
lines. Debates about taxes and tariffs, for example, split Repub-
licans residing in New England and the upper northwest (Wis-
corisin, Minnesota, Michigan, and the northern portions of Illi-
32. Congressional Globe, 37th Congr., 2d sess., pp. 3276-78.
33. Ibid., 3278.
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nois and Indiana) from those in the lower portions of Illinois^
Indiana, Ohio, and Iowa.^ Other issues, particularly railroad
bonds, widened cleavages between urban and rural Republi-
cans and between easterners and westerners. Many westerners
shared a growing resentment of New York and saw a conflict
that pitted eastern speculators, brokers, money-changers, and
bondholders against the productive toiling men of the country.^ '^
The Iowans' battle over judicial reorganization revealed yet an-
other schism, this one between the steamboat states on the west
side of the Mississippi River and the railroad state of Illinois.
Reeling from structural changes to the economy and massive
debts to railroad bondholders, Iowans sought to avoid the ap-
pointment of a pro-railroad justice in their circuit.
From February through May of 1862, the Iowa congressional
delegation and their allies successfully stalled the judicial re-
organization legislation. In early June the Chicago Tribune asked,
"What has become of the bill reorganizing the Supreme Court?"
Pointing to the disparities between the North and the South and
to all of the westem states that had yet to be assigned to a circuit,
the Tribune demanded that Congress take action and not "leave
the court in this wretched condition."^*
Under growing pressure, the House and Senate needed to
act. In June, despite Grimes's efforts, the Senate rejected Iowa's
plan and passed a version of the bill that lumped Iowa with
Illinois. But in the House, where Wilson sat on the Judiciary
Committee, the bill passed in Wilson's form, with Iowa placed
in a judicial circuit with Missouri, Kansas, and Minnesota.
When the House and Senate then met in a conference commit-
tee on the issue, Wilson went to work. Most of the members of
the joint committee hailed from eastern states unaffected by
the bill, and they probably would have accepted any version
that would allow the drawn-out process to be completed so that
new justices could be appointed. Because Wilson stubbornly
insisted on his version of the Ninth Circuit, a majority of the
34. Heather Cox Richardson, Vie Greatest Nation of the Earth: Republican Eco-
nomic Policies during the Civil War (Cambridge, MA, 1997), 2,12,15,80.
35. Ibid., 13,80.
36. Chicago Tribune, 5 June 1862.
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other members of the conference committee eventually acqui-
esced, and the bill emerged with Iowa in a new circuit of states
exclusively from west of the Mississippi, while Illinois joined
Wisconsin and Michigan in the Eighth Circuit (see map 3 above).
On July 12, Congress passed the Judicial Reorganization Act
of 1862 by a unanimous vote in the House and a vote of 24 to 12
in the Senate. Lincoln also approved the measure, and on July
15, with his signature, the bill became law. The Iowans had
"delayed and jeopardized circuit reorganization," but they had
won.^ '^  Iowa joined a circuit in which three of the four states
were tied to the river trade. Iowans now urged Lincoln to ap-
point a justice who knew the hopes, dreams, and bitter disap-
pointments of the river towns all too well: Samuel Freeman
Miller.
MILLER'S SUPPORTERS had begun lobbying for his ap-
pointment from the moment Congress started debating judicial
reorgarüzation. Iowa judges and lawyers barraged Lincoln with
letters that served a dual purpose. Not only did they tout Miller
as the right man for the job, they reminded Lincoln that Iowans
desired their own circuit and representation on the Court. "The
citizens of the Upper Mississippi Valley," wrote one Keokuk
lawyer, "believe that this region of the country is entitled to be
represented on the federal bench." "I hope your excellency will
be pleased to compliment Iowa, whose devotion to our Union is
so manifest & deserving," former Iowa Congressman Darùel F.
Miller chimed in, "with the appointment of Mr. Miller." Several
letter writers emphasized the steadfast Republicanism of a man
who was "an earnest Patriot and conscientious Republican" and
"unwavering in his political creed."*"
But letters came from Democrats as well as Republicans,
reflecting Iowans' recogrütion that Miller represented their best
hope for a sympathetic voice on the Court. Almost all spoke of
37. Silver, Lincoln's Supreme Court, 55.
38. Edward Johnstone to Abraham Lincoln, 20 December 1861, Lincoln Papers,
Library of Congress, microfilm, reel 30, doc. 13503; Daniel F. Miller to Lincoln,
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Samuel Freeman Miller, 1816-1890.
Photo from State Historical Society of
Iowa, lozua City.
Miller's sharp mind, and many described him as the top lawyer
in the state.^ ^ Iowa Federal District Court Judge J. M. Love wrote
on Miller's behalf, even though as a Keokuk Democrat, Love
had sparred with Miller in the past. "Personally I have been a
friend of Mr. Miller," Love informed Lincoln, "but politically
opposed him." As Keokuk neighbors, however. Love and Miller
agreed on certain topics. "As Judge of the District Court of Iowa,"
Love wrote. Miller had "been engaged in constant and extensive
practice before me." In the district court. Judge Love had heard
Miller's argument in the Rock Island Bridge case and agreed
39. Joseph C. Knappe (former U.S. Attorney in Iowa) to Lincoln, 4 January
1862, ibid., reel 31, doc. 13822; Caleb Baldwin (Iowa Supreme Court judge) to
Lincoln, 16 December 1861, ibid., reel 30, dw. 13424; George C, Wright (Iowa
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with Miller that the bridge should be destroyed. In his opinion
siding with Miller, Love had warned that if he allowed that rail-
road bridge to stand, "we shall probably, in no great period of
time, have railroad bridges upon the Mississippi River at every
forty or fifty miles of its course."^" As a river town resident and
pro-steamboat judge. Love now wanted Miller on the Supreme
Court.
Miller was flattered that so many Iowa Democrats lobbied
for his nomination. "It was a time of great political excitement,"
he later recalled, "and I have always felt peculiarly gratified that
members of the bar who were zealous Democrats vied with those
of the Republican party, of which I had since its first organiza-
tion been an active supporter, in the sincerity and vigor of their
recommendations."^' The bipartisan support for Miller reflected
a regional worldview that Iowa's Democrats and Republicans
shared. Outside of Iowa, Dem^ocratic Copperheads portrayed
Republicans as the party of eastern bondholders and railroad
directors who reaped windfall profits from the war, and they
claimed that Lincoln's support for tariffs, the national banking
system, and government bonds enriched northeastern capital-
ists at the expense of farmers and laborers. But in Iowa, Repub-
licar\s shared Democrats' views of bondholders and railroad
magnates. When it came to eastem capitalists. Republicans and
Democrats in Iowa shared a westem, trans-Mississippi perspec-
tive. Thus, men of both parties favored Miller's appointment to
the Court."
Some Iowans pressed Miller's case in person. Miller himself
asked Lincoln's assistant postmaster general, John Kasson of
Des Moines, to meet with the president on his behalf. Lincoln,
Kasson soon learned, had not heard of Miller and confused him
with Daniel F. Miller, who had once represented Iowa in the
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Congress. Meeting with Lincoln, Kasson corrected the misun-
derstanding and described Samuel Miller's qualifications to the
president.^^ On another occasion, Iowa Govemor Samuel Kirk-
wood, Senator James Harlan, and several Iowa congressmen
went to the White House to urge Lincoln to appoint Miller. At
that meeting, the Iowans, assuming that Lincoln knew why
they had come, launched into their case without mentioning
Miller's name or the position to which they wanted him ap-
pointed. Lincoln, who was well aware of the Iowar\s' hopes,
used the opportunity to humorous advantage. He "picked up
his pen, and drawing a paper to him as if to make the appoint-
ment in compliance with their wishes, said to them, 'what is the
office and whom do you wish to be placed in it?'" "We wish,"
an astounded Harlan quickly replied, "to have Mr. Miller of
Iowa chosen by you to the vacancy on the Supreme Bench."
"Well, well," Lincoln replied, putting down his pen and push-
ing back the paper, "that is a very important position and I will
have to give it serious consideration. I had supposed you
wanted me to make some one a Brigadier General for you." The
chagrined Iowans left with no assurances/^ i
As the process moved forward, Iowans back home and in
Washington flooded Lincoln's desk with more material in sup-
port of Miller. In addition to the numerous letters from the Iowa
bar and bench, Lincoln received written entreaties from Iowa's
state legislature and "Iowa State Citizens." Wilson and Grimes
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also circulated petitions for Miller's appointment in the U.S.
House and Senate and managed to procure the signatures of 28
senators and 120 congressmen.^^
Lincoln, of course, had other concerns in the spring and
summer of 1862 in addition to judicial reorganization and a
possible appointment for Miller. In April the war in the West
had taken a terrible tum. Horrific losses at the Battle of Shiloh,
where twenty thousand men had been killed or wounded, con-
vinced Lincoln and General Ulysses S. Grant that subduing the
South would not be a quick or easy task. The war. Grant now
concluded, could be won only by total conquest For Lincoln,
who did not want the war to become "a remorseless revolution-
ary struggle," this was a disheartening realization. In the East,
matters also looked bleak. In May and June 1862, Stonewall
Jackson's Confederate forces scored stunning successes in the
Shenandoah Valley, while the carnage at the Battle of the Seven
Days appeared to signal the start of a bloody summer." With the
war escalating and the fate of the Union in doubt, pressing
military matters slowed Lincoln's consideration of potential
Supreme Court nominees.
When Lincoln did consider possible appointees for the
Court, his primary criterion was finding justices who would
support his war measures. Because the Civil War dominated all
aspects of his presidency, the effect a proposed Court member
might have on the conduct of the war took on paramount im-
portance. Lincoln sought men likely to support both the war
effort and even his most constitutionally suspect policies. Sam-
uel Miller's supporters let Lincoln know that their man met
those criteria. Outspoken in his opposition to the expansion of
slavery. Miller had actively campaigned for Lincoln in Iowa in
1860. And, after the election, as civil war loomed. Miller urged
crowds at Republican rallies to reject last-minute attempts at
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sectional compromise that would have required concessions to
slaveholders. After Fort Sumter, Miller helped organize regi-
ments in Iowa and gave fiery speeches demanding that the
traitorous rebellion be crushed.'' Familiar with his steadfast
Uniorüsm, Miller's supporters emphasized his patriotism and
unwavering commitment to Republican principles in their ap-
peals to the president. Preoccupied with the war effort, Lincoln
had to rely on the recommendations of others, and Miller's
supporters provided him with plenty.*" Lincoln told one Iowan
that "he had not known such a unanimous recommendation of
any man for any office, and felt that he could not err in making
the appointment of a Federal Judge so generally approved by
an intelligent bar, and, not less important in such a crisis, by a
patriotic people."*'
IN THE END, Lincoln chose Miller without first meeting him.
It is possible that Lincoln thought such a meeting was urmeces-
sary, for the president knew men like Miller. From Miller's back-
ground and qualifications, the president must have recognized
a familiar tale, for in many ways. Miller's past mirrored Lin-
coln's own. Bom seven years apart in the same state, Lincoln
and Miller both grew up on hardscrabble family farms in slave-
holding Kentucky. Both men hated the mind-numbing, back-
breaking existence on preindustrial farms, and in early adult-
hood they rejected the life of their parents. As a means to
prominence and upward mobility, they both eventually chose a
career in law and thrived in that profession. Gravitating to the
Whig Party, Lincoln and Miller championed Henry Clay's
American System of internal improvements, factories, banks,
tariffs, and aggressive economic growth. They embraced the
notion of a modem, urbanized America teeming with factories.
"Lincoln fought his entire political life for industrialization,"
one historian has written, "and there was not a pastoral bone in
47. Keokuk Gate City, 14 July and 17, 23, 28, and 30 August 1860, 28 January, 19
April, and 25 May 1861.
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his body."'*" Miller shared Lincoln's views. During his early ca-
reer in southeastern Kentucky, he supported industrialization,
urbanization, the national bank, and tariffs and hoped that Cas-
sius Clay's vision of a "Kentucky System" would bring factories
and economic salvation to his town. When he moved to Iowa, it
was Keokuk's economic vitality, not the region's fertile soil, that
attracted him. In Keokuk, Miller saw an embryonic Chicago,
and he wanted to reap the benefits of having been there at the
start as it grew into a major metropolis. When Lincoln grimly
described a nonindustrial world where "all is cold and still as
death—no smoke rises, no furnace roars, no anvil rings," he
could have been describing Barbourville, the Kentucky town
that Miller fled, or the Keokuk that might be if that city could
not escape its disastrous debts to bondholders.^'
Lincoln and Miller both also celebrated free labor, the right
to rise in life, and the "self-made man." America was a remark-
able land, Lincoln believed, where the "peruiiless beginner in the
world labors for wages awhile, saves a surplus with which to
buy tools and land, for himself; then labors on his own account
another while, and at length hires another beginner to help him."
"This," Lincoln proclaimed, "is free labor—the just and gener-
ous, and prosperous system which opens the way for all—gives
hope to all, and energy and progress, and improvement of con-
dition to all."'' Lincoln had risen in life, and he was confident
that in America others could, too. Miller shared Lincoln's views
on this point. As a young man in the Barbourville Debating So-
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ciety. Miller's unbridled optimism about his country had led him
to argue that the American economic system did not unfairly fa-
vor the wealthy and that talent was more important than wealth
in achieving success." Because slavery denied both blacks and
nonslaveholding whites the opportunity to rise, both men hated
the peculiar institution and moved west to get away from it.
When the Kansas-Nebraska Act threatened to bring slavery to
what had been free soil, both men vehemently opposed it. And
when that act irreparably split the Whigs along sectional lines.
Miller and Lincoln joined the Republican Party and never looked
back.
The parallels between Lincoln and Miller are hardly star-
tling, however. Theirs was a common story, played out many
times in the antebellum West. America's expansion provided
unprecedented opportunities, both for those seeking farmland
and for men like Lincoln and Miller who chased urban, bour-
geois dreams. Self-made men formed the backbone of the Whig
and Republican Parties. Much of the support for both parties
came from people who had succeeded in the nineteenth-century
economy and who believed that others with talent and ambi-
tion should follow their example. '^' Thus, when Miller's sup-
porters told Lincoln of Miller's rural Kentucky roots. Whig
background, career in law, antislavery views, and conversion to
Republicanism, the president must have felt reassured. Based
on Lincoln's wartime criteria for Court appointments. Miller
was a worthy candidate.
But while they shared similar backgrounds and held many
of the same views, the wartime priorities masked differences in
economic philosophy between Lincoln and Miller, distinctions
that in peacetime might have made Lincoln wary of Miller.
After the Panic of 1857, Miller began to believe that capital had
concentrated dangerously in the hands of parasitical financiers.
Lincoln, on the other hand, still believed that capitalists, farm-
ers, laborers, and merchants had a harmony of interests. Be-
cause Americans could rise, social mobility ensured that today's
53. Ross, "Hill-Country Doctor," 430-62.
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laborer could be tomorrow's capitalist. Lincoln did not believe
the capitalist class had grown unduly large or powerful. In-
stead, he feared that attacks on capitalists, such as calls for the
repudiation of debts, undermined property, and if property was
not secure, the incentive to labor diminished. "Let not him who
is houseless pull down the house of another," Lincoln admon-
ished, "but let him labor diligently and build one for himself,
thus by example assuring that his own shall be safe from vio-
lence when built." Although Lincoln was willing to tax the rich
disproportionately to pay for the war, he almost certainly would
have opposed Miller's attempts to manipulate Iowa law so that
Iowa river towns could escape their contracted debts to eastern
financiers. ^^
In calmer times, factors besides slavery and the war cer-
tainly would have entered the nomination equation. Without
wartime distractions, the Iowa river towns' attempts to escape
their railroad debts through litigation would almost certainly
have received some attention from Lincoln. In the years before
slavery took center stage, Lincoln had been obsessed with eco-
nomic issues, of which the repudiation of railroad bonds in Illi-
nois was one. In other circumstances, Lincoln may well have
asked Kirkwood, Harlan, Kasson, or the other Iowans pushing
Miller's nomination where their man stood on municipal bonds.
He would not have liked the answer. But in the whirlwind of
civil w a^r. Miller's views of bondholders did not surface. Miller
was sound on race, slavery, and the war; that was all that was
required.
ON JULY 16, 1862, the day after the enactment of the Judicial
Reorganization Act, President Lincoln nominated Samuel Free-
man Miller for the seat representing the new Ninth Circuit on
the United States Supreme Court. He sent Miller's nomination
to the Senate, where it was confirmed within half an hour.^ * On
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July 19, Miller received his commission, and on July 21 Chief
Justice Taney administered Miller's oath of office.
Iowa's representatives in Washington "most heartily re-
joiced."^^ They had, within the span of a few days, scored two
dramatic successes, as both a trans-Mississippi circuit and the
appointment of Miller became realities. In Iowa, Republicans
cheered, anticipating that Miller would give their values a voice
on the Court. The new justice, it was noted, brought with him a
westem view of the law that favored practicality over prece-
dents. While some historians have charged Miller with having
"little systematic approach to the law," Iowans saw this charac-
teristic as a strength. Miller was a judge who sought to achieve
results first and then found the arguments to justify those re-
sults.^ " If justice demanded that river towns be free from their
bond debts, for example. Miller would find a way. Unlike men
from the tradition-bound East, Miller thought practically and
was not awed "by the dust of antiquated precedents." "He is
[the] model," the Keokuk Gate City trumpeted, "the beau ideal
of a Westem lawyer and a Westem Judge and his advent to the
Bench cannot fail to create a sensation even in that fossilized
circle of venerable antiquities which constitutes the Bench of the
Supreme Court of the United States. No better appointment has
been made in our time." "The appointment is a most excellent
one," Des Moines's Daily State Register declared, "and grateful
to the people of Iowa."^^
While Iowans cheered, the eastern press met Miller's ap-
pointment with confusion. Miller was so little known that the
New York Tribune mistook him for Daniel F. Miller (as Lincoln
had earlier). "Mr Miller's name is printed Samuel in the dis-
patches," the Tribune posited, "but we presume it is Daniel F.
Miller, the first Whig member of Congress ever chosen from
Iowa.""' Most papers knew so little about Miller that they ran
only an abbreviated dispatch stating that the appointment was
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made.*' One paper did manage to provide a thumbnail sketch of
the new justice. "Many able men, being also modest, remain
comparatively unknown," remarked Chicago's Christian Times.
"In politics, Mr. Miller was originally a Whig, but when that
party was destroyed by mint-juleps, his antislavery sentiments
found early congeniality in the Republican organization." They
also noted that Miller, ui\like Swayne, was not wealthy. He is
"economical in his way of life, but not parsimonious . . . though
not rich.""
Shortly after taking his oath of office. Miller retumed to
Keokuk to accept congratulations and orgaruze his affairs. To
celebrate, he and his wife, Eliza, hosted Iowa's prominent
judges and lawyers at their house for a night of dining, toasts,
and speeches. "We understand the evening passed very pleas-
antly," the Cate City reported, with "the distinguished host and
his accomplished lady doing all in their power to render their
visitors perfectly at home. The bar of Iowa, as well as the peo-
ple, feel a just pride in being represented on the Bench of the
Supreme Court by Judge Miller." The next day. Miller gave a
rousing speech at a war meeting.*"^
Before leaving for Washington, Miller once again proved his
commitment to a vigorous prosecution of the war. In August
1862, the Keokuk town council passed a law requiring sus-
pected southem sympathizers to swear an oath of allegiance to
the United States. Although Keokuk never suffered from the
internecine warfare between unionists and southern sympa-
thizers that was ongoing in neighboring Missouri, plenty of
former southerners still lived in town, and their loyalty re-
mained in doubt. The town council hoped to root out would-be
Confederates with test oaths. Before heading to the East, Miller,
now a United States Supreme Court justice, helped administer
the oaths. If Lincoln wanted a justice who would support con-
troversial war measures, he had picked the right ^
61. Chicago Tribune, 18 July 1862; New York Times, 17 July 1862; Baltimore Sun, 17
July 1862; Washington Daily Globe, 17 July 1862; New York World, 17 July 1862.
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OF ALL OF LINCOLN'S APPOINTEES—he eventually
filled five seats on the Court—Miller proved the most steadfast
in his support of the president's war policies. During the con-
flict. Miller joined opinions that upheld Lincoln's view that the
Confederacy was not a sovereign nation and the president's
unilateral decision to blockade southem ports."' Many cases in-
volving Lincoln's wartime measures, moreover, did not reach
the Court until after Appomattox and, with the hostilities ended.
Justices David Davis, Salmon P. Chase, and Stephen J. Field—
Lincoln appointees all—allowed peacetime sensibilities to dic-
tate their views. In famous cases such as Hepburn v. Griswold and
Ciimtnings v. State of Missouri, some of Lincoln's justices held
that his wartime measures had been unconstitutional. Miller,
however, unswervingly concluded that the chief executive's
actions were constitutionally justified by the national crisis.^
In addition to becoming Lincoln's most resolute defender in
the war powers cases, however. Miller also became the most
radical anticapitalist voice on the Court—a voice that reflected
Iowans' continuing anger at eastem bondholders. "I have met
with but few things of a character affecting the public good of
the whole country," Miller wrote in 1878, "that has shaken my
faith in human nature as much as the united, vigorous, and
selfish efforts of the capitalists."^' In numerous dissents. Miller
railed against his fellow justices because he thought they un-
fairly favored the wealthy and were beholden to the capitalist
class.** "It is the most painful matter concemed with my judicial
life," Miller wrote of the Court's positions in the railroad bond
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cases, "that I am compelled to take part in a farce whose result
is invariably the same, namely to give more to those who have
already, and to take away from those who have little the little
they have."''" These were views that President Lincoln, had he
lived, almost certainly would not have shared. Because Lincoln
opposed debt repudiation and believed that capitalists provided
a valuable economic function, he may well have disapproved of
this radical aspect of Miller's jurisprudence.
During the Civil War, Iowa's congressional delegation fought
long and hard to have President Lincoln nominate a justice who
shared Iowans' ideological views. As part of their strategy, they
obstructed the passage of the Judicial Reorganization Act of 1862
until Iowa was placed in a circuit with other states with similar
economic and political concerns. They then joined other Iowans
in pressuring the president to appoint Samuel Freeman Miller,
a man who had lived through the economic tribulations experi-
enced by Iowa's river towns in the late 1850s. In the process,
they successfully convinced Abraham Lincoln, a president who
was understandably distracted by wartime concems, to appoint
a justice about whom he might later have had mixed feelings.
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